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In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Courts first opinion to
apply the First Amendment to the Internet, Justice Stevens
compared the World Wide Web to both a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications, and a
sprawling mall offering goods and services.1 He could not have
known in 1997 how sprawling the mall would become, with
Amazon, eBay, Silk Road, and so on, and we surely cannot
imagine the sprawl to come in the future. But the emergence of
3D printing technology nevertheless allows us to see what is
coming: a mall in which shoppers not only form contracts for
goods, but also take possession of the goods themselves after
they are, for all intents and purposes, delivered over the wires.2
If the Internets mall was metaphorical in 1997, that mall will
become increasingly literal as home manufacturing becomes
more effortless. And at the same time, it will become ever
clearer that certain uses of the Internet do not resemble a
library in any meaningful sense.
© 2016 Kyle Langvardt
* The author thanks Emmalyn Helge, Arlen Langvardt, and Thomas
Langan for their helpful comments throughout.
1. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
2. After locating an object you wish to 3D print on thingiverse.com, a
user takes possession of printing instructions by clicking Download this
thing! See generally THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com (last visited
Feb. 16, 2016) (offering various files to download for 3D printing purposes).
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I. THE MALL AND THE LIBRARY
The mall and the library make a nice metaphor for a
fundamental point of constitutional law: namely, that the
regulation of commercethe mallis presumptively for the
legislature rather than the courts, while the regulation of
speechthe libraryis presumptively off-limits under the
First Amendment. That distinction is the product of two
familiar constitutional moments.
The mall became regulable without serious judicial
oversight in 1937, with the end of what we now describe as the
Lochner era.3 During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court
applied a restrictive reading of the commerce clause4 together
with expansive readings of the Fourteenth Amendments due
process and equal protection clauses to intercept a wide variety
of commercial regulations including price, wage, and labor
laws.5 After the Court abandoned those doctrines under
extraordinary political pressure, the judiciary effectively left
the field.6 Today, ordinary business regulations receive only a
rational basis review, and the standard is very forgiving.7 In
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. and United States
v. Carolene Products Co., for instance, the Court upheld laws
having no credible purpose but to protect the market share of
the industries that had lobbied for them.8 Those decisions
3. So-named for a landmark case emblematic of the reigning
jurisprudential trend at the time: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(rejecting an argument that New York State could regulate bakers work
hours under public health-related police powers).
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes).
5. See Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism, 2 INTL J. CONST. L. 1, 45 (2000).
6. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 39697 (1937) (upholding
Washington States minimum wage law against a substantive due process
challenge); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 4649 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act over a commerce clause
challenge).
7. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (highlighting the leniency of rational basis review by proclaiming that
[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it).
8. Id. at 48788 (1955) (The Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.
It appears that in many cases the optician can easily supply the new frames or
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represent a clear determination by the Court not to sit as a
board of review in matters of economic policy.
As for the library, it became nearly unregulable during the
Courts dramatic expansion of speech freedoms in the 1950s,
60s, and early 70s. By the end of this period the Court had
made it impossible for the government to suppress politically
subversive speech or advocacy of violence except for under
extremely narrow circumstances.9 The Court had made clear
that the government was not to punish speech because it
offended morals, taste, or propriety, except in the narrow
category of obscenity.10 And the Court had also extended
speech protections to expressive conduct such as the burning of
an American flag.11 By the early- to mid 1970s, the library was
firmly established as the malls constitutional opposite.
It is therefore important if the Internet contains both
libraries and malls to keep the two straight for constitutional
purposes. There is considerable overlap, to be sure, as in a
market for downloadable music or streaming television; and to
the extent that these areas are both library and mall, they
new lenses without reference to the old written prescription. . . . But the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional.); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938) ([T]he question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk
should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly
prohibited. As that decision was for Congress, neither the finding of a court
arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be
substituted for it.).
9. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (confining liability
for advocacy of violence to cases in which the danger is imminent, probability
is high, and incitement is intended). Cf. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
70608 (1969) (holding that a draftee saying [i]f they ever make me carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. was not prosecutable as
having made a true threat against the life of the President).
10. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing
the contemporary definition for obscenity); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
16, 26 (1971) (reversing a breach of peace conviction of a defendant who wore
jacket bearing words fuck the draft in courthouse hallway); Kingsley Intl
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959)
(reversing the motion picture boards refusal to license Lady Chatterleys
Lover because the film portrayed that adultery under certain circumstances
may be proper behavior).
11. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable. . . . We have not recognized an exception to this
principle even where our flag has been involved.); cf. United States v.
OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (assuming without deciding that expressive
conduct falls under the First Amendment).
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must be treated as libraries that are more or less immune to
regulation. But some areas, and certainly markets for 3D-
printable goods, deserve to be treated as malls and regulated
freely.
Allow me to flesh out the distinction. Most of the
contemporary Internets content layer consists of the sort of
expression that cannot be regulated without raising First
Amendment concerns. This expression includes online news
and entertainment as well as most social media and personal
communications. All of it is a library, a First Amendment
space. But that does not, of course, guarantee that all of it is
protected, i.e., constitutionally unregulable, and it does not
mean that it is all on an even keel for First Amendment
purposes. But it does mean that these forms of online speech
can only be regulated in accordance with the same general
framework of First Amendment law that applies in real space.
At least some speech that is connected with online
commerce may also belong to the library. Obviously the
downloadable music and movies sold on iTunes do not lose
their status as speech simply because consideration has been
exchanged; the profit motive is as irrelevant to First
Amendment analysis online as offline.12 And there may be
other commerce-related expression online that implicates the
First Amendmentnamely, speech in furtherance of
marketing. Buy a hammer on Amazon, and you will encounter
pictures and descriptions of the hammer on the product page,
customer-contributed reviews of the hammer, a
recommendation that you buy nails as part of the same
purchase, and perhaps a banner advertising that other items
are on sale.13 Most of this probably enjoys some sort of
protection, just as a rote application of 1970s-vintage
commercial speech doctrine would protect the same materials if
they were displayed in a physical mall.14
12. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 50102 (1952)
(That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit
does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is
safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit
should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.).
13. See, e.g., Stanley 51-616 16 Ounce Hickory Handle Nailing Hammer,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Stanley-51-616-Hickory-Handle-
Nailing/dp/B00002X1X5/ref=sr_1_2?s=power-hand-tools&ie=UTF8&qid
=1456609564&sr=1-2&keywords=hammer (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
14. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 36880 (1977) (holding
that the First Amendment prohibits a blanket ban on all attorney
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None of this establishes, though, that the commerce itself
becomes part of the library simply because it is transacted on
the Internet. Amazon, for instance, remains a mall at its core,
and as such, it may be regulated without any special scrutiny.15
For instance, my home state of Michigan imposes a 6% tax on
purchases I make on Amazon and other online retailers.16 As
far as I know, no one argues that these taxes implicate the
First Amendment. Nor should they, as the creation and
performance of contracts is plainly commercial in nature.
Purchasing a hammer is expressive behavior only in the most
trivial sense, and I would say the same about the subliminal
cryptographic handshakes17 that make the transaction
possible. The fact that I and Amazon have communicated with
each other is intuitively irrelevant, in spite of the many
formulations of free speech that say the First Amendment
kicks in whenever one party sends any sort of message to
another. Amazon is plainly a mall, and the First Amendment
has no general bearing on its business model.
Suppose, then, that instead of buying a physical hammer
on Amazon, I purchase access rights to a computer-aided
design (CAD) file representing that hammer. (There is not yet
any such market on Amazon, but the item can be obtained for
$2.99 today on threeding.com.18) I then use the CAD file to
print a physical hammer in my home using some kind of 3D
printer. Am I still in the mall, or am I now in the library? I
advertising); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 9297 (1977)
(holding an ordinance that prohibited most signs advertising the sale of homes
in the township unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Va. Pharmacy
Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 76165 (1976) (holding
that commercial advertising of prescription drug information falls under the
protection of the First Amendment). The protections extended to commercial
speech for the first time in the 1970s are consolidated in Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 56162 (1980) (holding
a regulation that completely banned promotional advertising by electrical
utilities unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
15. As a mall offering goods for sale, economic regulations of Amazon
would only receive rational basis review by the courts. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
16. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.52(b)(3) (West 2016).
17. See generally Shazia Yasin et al., Cryptography Based E-Commerce
Security: A Review, 9 INTL J. COMPUTER SCI. ISSUES 132, 13237 (2012),
http://ijcsi.org/papers/IJCSI-9-2-1-132-137.pdf (discussing various security
communications used in e-commerce which are argued to constitute
expression).
18. Kitchen Hammer, THREEDING, https://www.threeding.com/3d-
printing-models/kitchen-hammer (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
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think it is obvious that I remain in the mallthat my purchase
of a hammer does not become an exercise of free speech simply
because Amazon and I have found a newfangled way to get
around UPS.
But this seems to be a minority view among twenty-first
century lawyers.19 Since the mid-1990s, courts have subscribed
to the position that human-comprehensible computer code,
setting aside its functional aspects, can operate as a language
for computer programmers to communicate ideas and
arguments to each other.20 For the sake of constitutional
analysis, codes linguistic properties are held to raise it to the
status of speech for First Amendment purposes.21 That has
19. See Alan Feuer, Cody Wilson, Who Posted Gun Instructions Online,
Sues State Department, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/cody-wilson-who-posted-gun-
instructions-online-sues-state-department.html (quoting renowned First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams commentson Cody Wilsons claim that
his 3D-printable gun instructions posted online enjoys First Amendment
protection[O]n the face of it, it seems to me like a serious claim.).
20. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000)
(discussing that speech does not lose First Amendment protection because it is
in the form of code); Bernstein v. U.S. Dept of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428
30 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that cryptographic computer source code is
speech protected by First Amendment); see also Jorge R. Roig, Decoding
First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age of YouTube,
Facebook and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 322 (2012)
(The question of First Amendment coverage of computer source code was a
hot topic in both academic debate and litigation around the turn of the
millennium.).
21. There remains some controversy at the edges on the question of
whether these properties define source code exclusively, or object code as
well. Source code is defined in most legal discussions as code written in easily
human-readable languages such as C or Python. Source Code, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). This
source code must then be compiled into a human-inscrutable object code
before a computer can use it to execute a program. See Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 44546 (2d Cir. 2001) (The object code version
would be incomprehensible to readers outside the programming community
(and tedious to read even for most within the community), but it would be no
more incomprehensible than a work written in Sanskrit for those unversed in
that language.). The legal source code/object code dichotomy, though, is really
only tenable at the limit; source code can be executed by machines at the
expense of efficiency, and object code can be read by human beings at the
expense of extreme tedium. At any rate, the distinction is irrelevant to the
CAD files that enable 3D printing, as they are not executable files, but
Euclidean descriptions of polygons. See CAD Video Tutorials, AutoCAD
TutorialUsing the POLYGON Command, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1G3xosG_tyM; Computer-Aided Design
(CAD) and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM), INC.,
http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/computer-aided-design-cad-and-computer-
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been the consistent line in the lower courts, and though the
Supreme Court has not weighed in, its recent case law
extending First Amendment protections to medical data
suggests the Court would take a similar approach.22 And the
argument is now being applied in the 3D printing context. In
Defense Distributed v. United States Department of State, a
case now before the Fifth Circuit, attorneys for the creator of a
3D-printed gun are arguing that the code contained in its
predicate CAD file amounts to speech about a constitutional
right.23
How seriously are we meant to take these arguments? If
we carry them through to their logical conclusion, then we
should expect strict scrutiny to define essentially all litigation
concerning the regulation of 3D-printable products. In last
years Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court announced
that strict scrutiny is to be applied to any regulation of speech
whose application varies based on the content of the message
even if it can be shown that the law is not in any way
motivated by concerns about the content.24 Thus in Reed, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to a local ordinance applying
different size and display requirements to temporary
directional signs and, for instance, signs advertising a
business.25 On these terms, most regulations of CAD files
would probably engage strict scrutiny, as well.26 If CAD files
representing Yoda figurines may be freely distributed and CAD
files representing guns may not, then the application of the law
aided-cam.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (Computer-aided design (CAD)
involves creating computer models defined by geometrical parameters.).
22. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (There is
thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for
First Amendment purposes.).
23. See Complaint at 7, ¶ 26, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dept of State, 121
F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-372-RP), 2015 WL 2149795
([T]he United States Constitution guarantees a right to share truthful
speechespecially speech concerning fundamental constitutional rightsin
open forums.) (emphasis added).
24. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) ( [A] law that is
content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
governments benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus
toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech.).
25. Id. at 2227.
26. See Julia Cosans, Note, Between Firearm Regulation and Information
Censorship: Analyzing First Amendment Concerns Facing the Worlds First 3-
D Printed Plastic Guns, 22 J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 915, 918 (2014)
([U]nder a First Amendment analysis, computer files containing the 3-d gun
blueprint should be classified as both expressive and functional.).
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will turn on the differing contents of those filescontents
expressed in the constitutionally-protected language of code.
If CAD files are considered speech, then the practical
implication is that markets for 3D-printable products can be
regulated only under the rarest of circumstances.
II. THE REGULATORY INTEREST IN CAD FILES
American governments have already begun to regulate
access to 3D-printable goods. In 2013, the City of Philadelphia
adopted an ordinance to ban the manufacture and possession of
3D-printed guns,27 and in the same year, the State Department
ordered Defense Distributed to remove the CAD files for the
Departments own firearm components from Defense
Distributeds website.28 Neither of these actions appear to have
been very effective, but we should not take them as proof that
the regulation of 3D printing is an inherently futile enterprise.
Still less should we assume that the government is done
attempting to regulate 3D-printable objects.
To the contrary, if we operate on the assumption that 3D
printing is an ascendant technology, then it follows that many
contemporary retail and delivery markets will eventually
become markets for access to 3D-printable designs. One can
then assume conservatively that the government will pursue
the same regulatory priorities in these new markets as in
traditional markets. That will mean continued efforts to
regulate the availability of weapons, the withdrawal of
hazardous products from the market, and, occasionally, laws
limiting access to certain types of products so that others may
be protected from competition.
In the age of 3D printing, these kinds of mundane
regulatory activities will usually require the government to
regulate access to CAD files online. I will discuss the kinds of
methods the government might use shortly. But suffice it to say
that if we assume CAD files are speech for constitutional
27. See PHILA., PA. CODE §§ 10-2001 to -2003 (2013) (originally proposed
as Phila. Bill No. 130584, banning manufacture of 3D-printed firearms
without a licence); Alexis Kleingman, Philadelphia Is the First U.S. City to
Ban 3d-Printed Guns, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:49 PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/3d-gun-philadelphia_n_4344733.html
(Not only are you not allowed to create 3D-printed guns, you cant own one or
even a piece of one.).
28. Complaint at 7, ¶¶ 2527, Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (No.
1:15-CV-372-RP), 2015 WL 2149795.
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purposes, it follows that the government will be engaged in
heavy censorship by regulating access to them.
You might object at this point that the government could
avoid triggering First Amendment scrutiny by regulating the
end-product rather than the distribution of its design file. Such
is the approach we have traditionally taken with blueprints
and recipesthe formula for crystal meth is out there even
though it is unlawful to cook it.29 Likewise with the Anarchist
Cookbook, which provides recipes for Molotov cocktails and
LSD.30 You can find instructions to build lawn darts online, in
spite of the fact that they have been off the market since
1988.31 One might be tempted to interpret the right to view the
blueprints for all of those illicit devices as a customary First
Amendment liberty.
But I am not sure that civil liberties considerations have
played much into the governments hands-off treatment of
blueprints. It seems more likely that regulators have simply
ignored blueprints because policing them would be costly and
ineffective. Instead, the time-honored technique for regulating
products is to apply pressure to a small number of choke
points along the chain of commerce through which all goods
must pass before reaching the consumer.32 These include
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.33 These entities are
highly-capitalized and sophisticated within their markets,
which give them the financial incentive and the operational
capability to comprehend and follow the regulations that
govern them. As for enforcement, it is reasonably feasible to
enforce a ban on noncompliant products against a small
29. I leave the Google search to the reader.
30. The original version is available now at Barnes and Noble for about
$17.89. See The Anarchist Cookbook, BARNES & NOBLE,
http://www.barnesandnoble.com (search The Anarchist Cookbook William
Powell) (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). A current version is available at JOLLY
ROGER, ANARCHY COOKBOOK VERSION 2000,
http://bnrg.cs.berkeley.edu/~randy/Courses/CS39K.S13
/anarchistcookbook2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). The LSD recipe looks
a little suspicious, and appears next to a recipe for Bananadine, an alleged
hallucinogen made from banana peels and water. See id. at § 158.
31. Jörg Sprave, BANNED IN USA: How to Make Lawn Darts, YOUTUBE
(June 28, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GdvIrNl8LY.
32. See, e.g., Products, Guidance & Regulations, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling (last visited Mar. 18, 2016)
(providing tobacco products compliance guidance to marketers,
manufacturers, and promoters).
33. Id.
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number of warehouses, factories, and retail outlets.34 Thus,
when the EPA rolls out new fuel efficiency standards for
automobiles, the government effectuates those standards by
placing a compliance burden on automobile manufacturers.35
That tends to get the job done, and it is not surprising that the
government does not take the additional measure of, for
example, ordering all copies of blueprints for noncompliant
vehicles to be burned.36
In a market for 3D-printable goods, all the traditional
choke points disappear.37 There is no longer any traditional
manufacturer sitting at a plant. Manufacturing takes place at
the end-point in the consumers home. There is no physical
distribution center.38 Printing and subsequent possession are
the only events in the life of a 3D-printed product to take place
in real space.
The absence of real-space choke points in markets for 3D-
printable goods dooms any real-space regulatory strategy to
fail. Consider Philadelphias 3D-printed gun ordinance, which
bans printing and possession of 3D-printed weapons without
attempting to regulate the distribution or possession of the
34. See, e.g., Claire Reilly, Australian Police Seize 3D Printed Gun Parts
and Knuckle Dusters in Raid, CNET.COM (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://www.cnet.com/news/3d-printed-gun-parts-and-knuckle-dusters-seized-
in-australia.
35. See generally Air Enforcement, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/air-enforcement#engines (last updated Dec. 1,
2015) (Motor vehicle engines and off-road vehicles and engines must meet
CAA emissions standards . . . . In addition, the composition of fuels used to
operate mobile sources, including gasoline, diesel, ethanol, biodiesel and
blends of these fuels, are also regulated under the CAA.).
36. See id. (noting the many players involved in EPAs CAA compliance
regime).
37. Cf. Joseph Burton et al., Panel III: Implications of Enforcing the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Case Study, Focusing on United States v.
Sklyarov, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805, 846 (2002)
(MR. LEHMAN: The problem here is that the person who is actually making
the unauthorized copy when something is sent out on the Internet en masse is
actually the end-user. I think one of the things about the Copyright Law is it
can never work successfully if you are going to go after each individual end-
user. That is why, as I said in my earlier remarks, historically you went after
the choke points, you went after the people who had the factory that produced
the illegal copies.).
38. See Claire Chabaud, 3D Printing and the Future Shape of Retail
Industry, SCULPTEO (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2015/12/23
/3d-printing-and-retail-industry (The distribution step will be fully
dematerialized, as 3D files can just be exchanged online.).
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CAD files.39 Such a law might not be completely worthless
today, when only a relative few have access to 3D printing
resources and it is conceivable that someone might buy a 3D-
printed gun in person or by mail.40 But in the long term, users
can be expected to produce such things at home.41 And in that
kind of market, it is unclear how the Philadelphia approach is
supposed to work except in isolated cases in which the
authorities get extraordinarily lucky.42
Whatever we conclude on the question of whether CAD
files constitute speech, then, the government will ultimately be
forced to choose between regulating the CAD files, on the one
hand, and leaving the market for 3D-printable items
completely laissez-faire, on the other.
III. RESTRICTING AVAILABILITY OF 3D-PRINTABLE
DESIGNS
At this point someone might raise a second objection: even
if it is impractical to regulate the end-product because 3D
printing eliminates the traditional regulatory choke points,
that does not imply that it is even possible to regulate the
online distribution of CAD files.43 There is an old saying that
39. See PHILA., PA. CODE § 10-2002 (2013) (No person shall use a three-
dimensional printer to create any firearm, or any piece or part thereof, unless
such person possesses a license to manufacture firearms under Federal law,
18 U.S.C. § 923(a).). The law does not speak to possession of a digital model
used in 3D gun printing. Id.
40. There are businesses today that 3D-print goods to order in specialized
facilities and then deliver them by mail to consumers. From Shapeways, for
instance, a user can order fan-designed 3D-printed My Little Pony statuettes.
Elizabeth A. Harris, Hasbro to Collaborate with 3-D Printing Companies to
Sell Artwork: Hasbro Selling My Little Pony Fan Art, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/business/hasbro-selling-my-little-
pony-fan-art.html. If someone set up a similar business around illicit plastic
firearms, then those firearms might eventually be traced back to their source.
41. E.g., Reilly, supra note 34.
42. The police in Japan, for instance, picked up the hobbyist Yoshimoto
Imura for printing 3D-printed guns after he posted a video of himself in
flagrante on YouTube. Suman Varandani, Yoshitomo Imura Becomes First
Person to Be Jailed for 3D Printing Guns, INTL BUS. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014,
6:34 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/yoshitomo-imura-becomes-first-person-be-
jailed-3d-printing-guns-1713084.
43. But see Andy Greenberg, Feds Tighten Restrictions on 3-D Printed
Gun Files Online, WIRED (June 11, 2015, 11:05 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/06/feds-restrict-3d-printed-gun-files (confirming
the U.S. State Departments intention to act as gatekeeper for when
Americans can legally publish online data that could allow someone to
digitally fabricate a gun).
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[t]he Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.44 If that is the case, then one might say that the
First Amendment point is moot.
I find this argument to be badly overstated. Surely 3D-
printed guns and other digital things can never be eradicated
entirely; determined people with the know-how will always be
able to get them. But if that qualifies a regulation as futile then
all regulations are futile. Regulations never set up a hermetic
seal against violation. Instead, at their best, they contain
violation by making it costly. And by that more appropriate
measure, some reasonably effective regulation of 3D-printed
products must be achievable.
Consider the Napster episode, in which an orgy of online
file sharing around the turn of the century nearly cratered the
music industry.45 The disruption that occurred might easily be
read as evidence that the Internet is fundamentally wild and
unregulable. But it is more accurate to say simply that music
distribution is less regulable than it once was. It is possible, of
course, to get a pirated copy of whatever you want, and it is not
terribly difficult. But for a user of average sophistication, it
takes a lot more time and hassle than it once did, and the
reason is that intellectual property owners have used legal
remediesmost prominently the notice-and-takedown
procedures of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
discussed belowto drive the exchange of proprietary content
underground.46 Simple inconvenience has driven many would-
be pirates back to industry-sanctioned markets such as
iTunes and Spotify.47 So while the copyright wars do
44. The saying is usually attributed to the software engineer John
Gilmore. See Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries; How Do
You Let the Good Fish Through the Net While Blocking the Bad? N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/15/business/limiting-
medium-without-boundaries-you-let-good-fish-through-net-while-
blocking.html.
45. See Brionna N. Ned, Note, Unenforceable Copyrights: The Plight of the
Music Industry in a P2P File-Sharing World, 33 REV. LITIG. 397, 40204
(2014) (describing the rise of peer-to-peer music sharing services in the wake
of Napsters demise).
46. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
47. Compliance measures by companies like Google have made it difficult
for users to access pirated materials while still maintaining that [t]he right
combination of price, convenience, and inventory will do far more to reduce
piracy than enforcement can. GOOGLE, HOW GOOGLE FIGHTS PIRACY 4 (2014),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2NmdYdGdJQnFTeTA/view?pr
ef=2&pli=1.
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demonstrate the Internets disruptive power, they hardly
demonstrate that the Internet is completely impervious to
control. Instead, they demonstrate that mainstream Internet
use is meaningfully responsive to regulatory pressures.48
Those pressures work because the Internet has regulable
choke points of its own. These include search engines, social
media platforms, and web space providers.49 The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act operates by pressing the
administrators of search engines, social media platforms, and
web space providers into the service of copyright owners.50 If a
user posts infringing content to YouTube, for instance, a
designated agent at YouTube may receive a takedown letter
from the copyright owner. If YouTube complies, then it is
guaranteed a safe harbor from litigation by either the copyright
owner or the user.51 YouTube always complies, and that is
almost always the end of the story.52 The system is troublingly
open to abuse by overzealous copyright holders who would
suppress parody or criticism; but in a dark way, those concerns
testify to the systems efficacy.53 The system accomplishes its
objectives; if it didnt, no one would subscribe to Netflix. I think
it would be surprising if the government did not use the same
techniques to limit access to illicit 3D-printable goods. In fact,
the State Department already appears to have groped rather
clumsily in that direction in Defense Distributed.54
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 50113 (2012). See
also Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown
Notice Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 387, 39094 (2009) (describing the takedown notice and
counter-notice procedures under DMCA, and providing an illustrative
example).
51. See Cobia, supra note 50 at 39394 (illustrating a potentially
commonplace usage of the DMCA to take down an infringing YouTube video).
52. See id. The statute leaves the user some recourse against the
copyright holder at this point, but only if the user gives up their anonymity
and effectively submits to being sued. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
53. See generally Matthew Schonauer, Let the Babies Dance:
Strengthening Fair Use and Stifling Abuse in DMCA Notice and Takedown
Procedures, 7 I/S: J.L. & POLY FOR INFO. SOCY 135, 152-57 (2011) (describing
DMCA abuses).
54. See Andy Greenberg, State Department Demands Takedown of 3D-
Printable Gun Files for Possible Export Control Violations, FORBES (May 9,
2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/09/state-
department-demands-takedown-of-3d-printable-gun-for-possible-export-
control-violation/#398d24ae3fb7 (highlighting the dilemma faced by regulators
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Other kinds of choke points are available as well. In China,
a small number of top-level gateway routers run all
international traffic into the country.55 The state runs filtering
software on those routers similar to the filters offices in the
United States might use to block access to objectionable or
time-wasting content.56 This Great Firewall means that users
within China cannot access blacklisted foreign materials except
through cumbersome proxy software.57 Domestically, Chinas
Golden Shield program requires commercial Internet service
providers (ISPs) to run software that scans for and removes
objectionable language automatically.58 Employees of licensed
ISPs are required by law to remove any remaining
unacceptable materials manually.59 Between the private and
public sector, roughly 100,000 people are thought to be policing
the Internet around the clock.60 A Reporters Without Borders
study in 2003 reported that it was impossible to post messages
in online forums that contained blacklisted language.61 More
subtly subversive messages would be deleted within minutes or
hours.62
Hopefully our own government never uses these tools for
the same ideologically-suppressive purposes. But it would
hardly be surprising for the government someday to use them
to police the distribution of 3D-printable designs, and I expect
that in time those measures would strike us as perfectly
normal. It is the speech-suppressive ends rather than the
means that raise concerns about the Great Firewall, Golden
when targeting only one of several possible defendants controlling the digital
information).
55. James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, ATLANTIC,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/the-connection-has-
been-reset/306650 (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
56. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 9295 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006)
(providing a rough diagram of Chinese Internet filtering practices).
57. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 1517 (Aug. 2006),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806webwcover.pdf (last
visited Mar. 18, 2016).
58. See id. at 1114.
59. See id.
60. How Does China Censor the Internet?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2013,
11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-censors-internet.
61. See GOLDSMITH &WU, supra note 56, at 96.
62. Id.
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Shield, and to a lesser extent the DMCA. The trouble with
Chinas policy, in other words, is that it regulates the library
too closely.
Close regulation of the mall, on the other hand, is not
nearly so offensive. Consider the position of a consumer who
participates in a market for thousands or millions of products
under some byzantine regulatory structure. We do not
ordinarily expect the consumer to ascertain a products
compliance with regulations before purchasing it off the shelf.
Instead, it is for the manufacturer to prevent noncompliant
products from reaching the shelf in the first place. When a
noncompliant product causes harm to a consumer, it is
generally the manufacturers fault for making it available, not
the consumers for purchasing it.63 That approach avoids
placing the consumer in an uncertain position relative to the
law, it insures that social costs are borne by the party who is in
the best position to avoid them, and it avoids setting up
senseless deterrents to productive economic transactions.64 It is
intuitive to carry the same approach over to an online mall of
3D-printable goods, where the content provider steps into the
shoes of the manufacturer and distributor.
To define such a market as a library would imply that the
downloader of a CAD file has not taken a product off the shelf,
but rather a book of code. As for the merchant selling that
product, they become a librarian only tenuously related to the
production process going on in the users 3D printer. And if
that merchant is held to account for selling bad wares, then
what could have been a simple question about product liability
will be overblown into a grand question about democracy and
human dignity.
This returns us, then, to the broad question I have posed:
does something require us to treat virtually all Internet
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
provides the model of strict liability for unreasonably dangerous materials in
tort, and the Uniform Commercial Codes implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose perform the same
function in contract. U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMMN
2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect.) (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18
WM. &MARY L. REV. 259, 262 (1976).
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activity as part of the library, or may we admit that online
commerce belongs more properly to the mall?
IV. THE UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF 3D
PRINTING
In their most celebrated confrontations with government,
computers and the Internet have quintessentially played the
role of speech media. Reno v. ACLU, in which Congress
attempted to impose credit card locks on any Internet media
considered inappropriate for children, is obviously a case about
free expression.65 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn, a
case about depictions of violence in video games, also deals
with matters that clearly implicate expression.66 Bernstein v.
United States Department of State and Junger v. Daley, which I
discuss below, deal with university professors who wish to use
source code as a teaching tool; those cases, too, have expressive
connotations because of their connection with the academy.67
Abroad, it is a speech concern when China and Saudi Arabia
filter for unacceptable material, or when in times of political
upheaval a strongman such as Hosni Mubarak simply shuts
down all Internet access within the territory he governs.68
But it is a fallacy to conclude from these confrontations
that computers or the Internet or data or information are
always free speech concerns.69 The First Amendments salience
is not the product of any technological token. Take the law
challenged in Reno v. ACLU and apply it to magazines and
VHS and you will find that the First Amendment analysis does
65. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
66. Brown v. Entmt Merchs. Assn, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
67. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. U.S. Dept
of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
68. See, e.g., James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt Leaders Found Off
Switch for Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technology/16internet.html (noting that
Egyptian Internet service providers are required to [shut down service] by
their licensing agreements if the government so decrees).
69. In United States v. OBrien, the Supreme Court assumed without
deciding that the burning of a draft card in a public antiwar protest was a
kind of expressive conduct. United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). No
one reads OBrien as a lesson that all behavior related to draft cards is
basically expressive, much less that the language printed on draft cards
casts a circle of speech protections around all matters having to do with the
draft. Yet we have a hard time avoiding those mistaken readings where
information technologies are concerned.
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not change.70 Or consider Brown v. Entertainment Merchants,
which extended First Amendment protections to video games.71
The technology is not the point. Assume, fancifully, that violent
video games operated from magic rather than computers, and
the expressive stakes would remain exactly the same. In
Justice Scalias words,
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video
games communicate ideasand even social messagesthrough many
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
players interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer
First Amendment protection.72
The technicality that Grand Theft Autos game data was
compiled a couple of years ago from source code that several
game designers read and discussed with each other is totally
irrelevant. As for the international examples of censorship,
those ends were speech-suppressive before they were ever
adapted to Internet use.
I suspect that we are biased toward a rule that code is
speech or that CAD files are only pictures mostly because of
the primitive state of information technologies over most of
their brief history. Sharp limitations on bandwidth, processing
power, memory, storage, and peripheral devices biased most
Internet use until the turn of the century to its most low-power
applicationsthe simplest of which, incidentally, was the
transmission of the written word. Thus the Internet in its early
ragged glory was overwhelmingly a platform for discussion and
expression, and much of that was discussion about the Internet
and computing.73 Legal confrontations involving the Internet
tended to raise concerns about the freedom of speech simply
because the Internets non-expressive capabilities had not yet
been rolled out.
70. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 893 (OConnor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (The [statute at issue] is therefore akin to a law that
makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic magazines to
anyone once a minor enters his store.).
71. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
72. Id.
73. For a general discussion on how the Internet was used during its early
stages, see Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET
SOCY, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-
internet/brief-history-internet#concepts (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (Email
provided a new model of how people could communicate with each other, and
changed the nature of collaboration, first in the building of the Internet itself
. . . and later for much of society.).
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Over the past twenty years or so, though, the Internet has
matured into other uses that are at best tangentially related to
speech concerns: online retail, bill payment, home monitoring,
Fitbitting, and the distribution of 3D-printable goods. A
reasonable person might want to see regulatory shelters for
these uses of technology for reasons that have nothing to do
with free speech. Consider, for example, the controversy
surrounding Uber, the algorithm-driven and mostly
unregulated cab service.74 One might praise Uber as
representing innovation and the traditionally regulated cab-
drivers unions represent stagnation and industry capture.75
Those are legitimate arguments, but they are not First
Amendment arguments. Instead, these arguments draw from
small-government conservatism, economic libertarianism,
Lochnerism, or some similar position.
3D printing presents a similar case, which is to say that
arguments for a freedom to print would relate more plausibly
to a freedom of contract than to the freedom of speech. If the
freedom of contract were still viable as a matter of
constitutional law,76 then the debate over 3D printing would be
framed in those terms. Instead, parties such as Defense
Distributed are left to frame their case in terms of free speech,
and so they do. I am concerned, though, that advocates who
frame economic liberties as speech liberties risk mooring the
prestige of speech freedoms at some middle station between the
two.
74. See Matthew Stoller, Ubers Algorithmic Monopoly: We Are Not
Setting the Price. The Market Is Setting the Price. We Have Algorithms to
Determine What that Market Is., TUMBLR.COM (Apr. 9, 2014, 6:45 PM),
http://mattstoller.tumblr.com/post/82233202309/ubers-algorithmic-monopoly-
we-are-not-setting (discussing the many policy debate issues surrounding
Ubers ascendancy in the cab market).
75. See, e.g., Larry Downes, Lessons from Uber: Why Innovation and
Regulation Dont Mix, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013, 5:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-uber-why-
innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/#3b55ad0731fd ([I]ts no wonder that in
the bizarro world of licensed taxicabs and limousines, incumbents faced with
the sudden arrival of disruptive technologies that could vastly improve their
quality, efficiency and profitability but which also introduce new competitors
and new supply chain partners, respond as if their very existence is
threatened. It is, of course.).
76. See Eugene Volokh, The Revival of the Contract Clause, REASON
FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://reason.org/news/show/pensions-contract-clause
(Since the New Deal, the Contract Clause, much like other economic rights,
has been afforded a relatively low level of protection.).
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Free speech doctrine applied to the letter against
regulations of 3D printing would require unrealistic policy
outcomes that lawyers have been trained to ridicule since the
end of the Lochner period.77 Say, for instance, that in the near
future the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
orders a recall of a 3D-printable pacifier design.78 The CPSC
orders websites that have posted the CAD file, or that sell
access to the file to remove it.79 Lets also say that the recall
doesnt make much sense: the evidence of a safety issue is
weak. If, at this point, the courts really believe that CAD files
are speech, then they will block the recall order under strict
scrutiny. And so it will go for any attempt by the government to
restrict the distribution of CAD files: only exceptionally well-
justified product regulations in that area will survive. Whether
you like that result or not, it amounts to a reinstatement of
Lochnerism: radical laissez-faire as a constitutional
command.80
It would come as quite a surprise if the courts were willing
to fill such a tall order, whether or not they held to the
ostensible position that code is speech. Talk, after all, is
cheap; it is one thing to say that code is speech, and another
altogether to follow those words through to what they imply in
the 3D printing context. I am skeptical that there is much
appetite at all among judges for strict scrutiny review in the
field of product regulation. It seems far more likely that
excessively-broad formulations of information, data, and
code as speech will be offset by watered-down First
77. See Choudhry, supra note 5, at 46 (noting the criticism of Lochner
from the legal community).
78. Such authority falls under 16 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (2015) (enforcement
procedure for toys presenting choking hazards).
79. See generally U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMMN, THE
REGULATED PRODUCT HANDBOOK 2337 (2013), http://www.cpsc.gov//Global
/Business-and-Manufacturing/Business-Education
/RegulatedProductsHandbook.pdf (prescribing procedures for recalling and
destroying regulated products).
80. See Choudhry, supra note 5, at 45 (During this period, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down close to two hundred state and federal laws
regulating a wide variety of market relationships . . . . [T]he Lochner era was
characterized by a judicial resistance to the regulatory, redistributive, and
activist state the likes of which the American constitutional system has not
since seen.).
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Amendment analyses that allow government the same leeway
to regulate that it enjoys in the ordinary course of business.81
The existing case law on code and the First Amendment is
consistent with this account. There is little evidence that
judges stated commitments to code-as-speech really drive the
outcomes. Eight opinions, by my count, hold that the code in
dispute is speech for First Amendment purposes.82 The First
Amendment challenger prevails in two of them, and in the
remaining six, the court holds that the First Amendment does
not confer protection.
The two First Amendment victories come early, in cases
involving educational uses of source code. In both Bernstein v.
United States Department of State and Junger v. Daley,
university professors sought clearance to post source code for
cryptographic algorithms on educational web pages about
computer science.83 The courts upheld their right to do so over
objections by the government that cryptographic source code
was subject to arms embargoes.84 These are the seminal cases
for the code-is-speech concept, and the ones most frequently
cited by advocates for a strong code-is-speech concept. But even
in these cases, it is not clear that the code-is-speech concept is
really necessary to the outcome. The overall picture of
academics who only want to teach their lessons without
81. Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of Information as Speech, 47
LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) ([E]xpanded First Amendment
coverage in peripheral areas might lead to a dilution of protection nearer to
the core.).
82. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 44549 (2d
Cir. 2001); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000); Def. Distributed
v. U.S. Dept of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 69192 (W.D. Tex. 2015); United
States v. Alavi, No. CR 07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1989773, at *1 (D. Ariz.
May 5, 2008); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 1085, 10991101 (N.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1111, 112627 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Bernstein v. U.S. Dept of State, 974
F. Supp. 1288, 1293, 1303 (N.D. Cal. 1997); DVD Copy Control Assn v.
Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 342, 34750 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). I do not count
Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000) in
this group. That case involved software that claimed to give its users sound
financial trading advice; the court declined to apply any First Amendment
scrutiny, holding that that computer instructions that induce action without
the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient are not
constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 111. Nor do I count Allied Veterans of
the World, Inc.: Affiliate 67 v. Seminole Cty., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (M.D.
Fla. 2011), which follows Vartuli.
83. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 48384; Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 129293.
84. Junger, 209 F.3d at 485; Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310.
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censorship has strong traditional First Amendment
connotations anyway.
The remaining cases arise under circumstances in which
the code-is-speech concept really does seem to be the exclusive
basis for the First Amendment challenge. In most of these
cases, the First Amendment claimants were parties who
developed methods for cracking digital rights management
schemes and who then either posted the source code online or
sought to sell it as software.85 The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act makes this kind of trafficking in circumvention
devices unlawful.86 In another case, a criminal defendant was
indicted for exporting nuclear reactor simulation software to
Iran in violation of embargoes.87 Finally, Defense Distributed
concerns the application of arms embargoes to 3D-printable
weaponry.88
The normal run of First Amendment opinions would say
that these provisions discriminate on the basis of content,
triggering strict scrutiny.89 But the courts seem to recognize in
each of these cases that they are dealing with exotic claims well
outside the mainstream of First Amendment litigation.90 As
such, they consistently resort to a doctrine called secondary
effects that allows them to downgrade to intermediate
scrutiny.91 Under the secondary effects doctrine, the anti-
circumvention provisions are cast as content-neutral because
they do not seem to be motivated by a desire to suppress a
85. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 43539; 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1089
90; Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 111719; DVD Copy Control Assn, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 341.
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2012) (proscribing the use and
trafficking of circumvention devices).
87. Alavi, 2008 WL 1989773, at *1 (It is true that software source code is
speech subject to First Amendment protections. However, BIS and OFACs
control on exporting nuclear reactor simulation software would withstand
intermediate scrutiny, which is appropriate for export prohibitions that are
based on the function, not the expressive content, of computer source code.).
88. See Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dept of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 686
87 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
89. See, e.g., Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (noting defendant Elcoms
arguments that strict scrutiny should apply because the restriction is content-
based); Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 694 (noting plaintiffs argument
that the regulation is content-based and thus invokes strict scrutiny).
90. See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 44958 (affirming the lower courts
characterization of the restrictions in question as content-neutral rather than
content-based).
91. See, e.g., Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 69394 (tracing the
history of the secondary effects doctrine in the Fifth Circuit).
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message; instead, they are aimed at the innocuous goal of
preventing copyright infringement.92
The secondary effects idea is generally regarded as a
corner-cutting measure to be applied only in cases involving
marginal sexual expression such as nude dancing, and in
2015s Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court signaled
clearly that it is no longer good law.93 But just a month later, in
the first opinion in Defense Distributed, Judge Robert Pitman
revived secondary effects to approve the State Departments
treatment of 3D-printable firearms.94 So it is fairly clear where
code stands today in the First Amendment order. It is speech,
but of such a disfavored character that judges will strain to
water down the analysis in whatever way is necessary to avoid
the serious regulatory limits that that premise entails.
I expect that this story will repeat itself as 3D printing
technology becomes cheaper and more accessible. If a
regulation of 3D printing is ever going to fall in First
Amendment litigation, now is the time. The technology today is
still mostly identified with a class of artists, tinkerers, and
makers who use it as a creative medium, and there is not
much money on the table.95 As the technology evolves, though,
92. See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 112932 (applying intermediate
scrutiny to the disputed statute).
93. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (A law that
is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
governments benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus
toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech . . . . In other words, an
innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one
that is content neutral.). See also Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Reaffirms
Broad Prohibition on Content-Based Speech Restrictions, in Todays Reed v.




([T]he majority never mentions secondary effects or cites Renton or any of
the other secondary effects cases. Presumably it isnt trying to silently
overrule those cases, especially since (1) they have been endorsed by some of
the Justices in the majority, and (2) there are enough such cases that they
cant be lightly dismissed as outliers (though I do think they are inconsistent
with the great bulk of free speech doctrine). Yet its hard to see how those
cases could be logically reconciled, on their own terms, with the majoritys firm
condemnation of facially content-based laws.).
94. See Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 69396.
95. See, e.g., Evan Chavez Sun, Makers Affair Poker Ping Pong Paddles
Could Be a Hit, 3D PRINTING INDUS. (Nov. 30, 2014),
http://3dprintingindustry.com/2014/11/30/makers-affair-poker-ping-pong-
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we can expect it to follow the same trajectory that other
information technologies have: it will reach a much larger class
of non-creative consumers who use it exclusively as an
appliance for convenient delivery of ready-to-print consumer
goods.96 It will begin to replace certain markets that are today
dominated by retail or mail delivery.97 Physical malls will close
down as people migrate to online malls. Once the offbeat
ambiance has faded and 3D printing has become the favored
method for replacing, say, a toilet paper holder, judges will be
less inclined to view CAD files primarily as a means for
visionaries to exchange big ideas. The post-Lochner instinct
will kick in, and even judges who claim to apply First
Amendment doctrine in cases on 3D printing will usually
dispense with those claims under something that, for practical
purposes, approximates the tepid rational basis review that
other commercial regulations receive. Whether or not the
doctrine recognizes the difference between the library and the
mall in theory, markets for 3D-printable goods are sure to be
treated as malls in fact.
V. ADMITTING THAT CODE IS RARELY SPEECH
In Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit held that [b]ecause
computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange
of information and ideas about computer programming, . . . it is
protected by the First Amendment.98 That formulation boils
down a set of ideas borrowed from Bernstein v. United States
Department of State, and sets down two tenets that purport to
guide the First Amendment analysis today in cases about code.
First, that human-readable code is speech per se, much like
paddles (describing a novel 3D-printed ping pong paddle set, and requesting
funding support via Kickstarter).
96. The transition may have already begun. See, e.g., Automotive,
STRATASYS, http://www.stratasys.com/industries/automotive (last visited Mar.
19, 2016) (operating a marketplace for custom-printed automotive parts).
97. See generally id.
98. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
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plain language.99 Second, that the speech contained in code is
about whatever function the code performs.100
It is time to admit how hard it is to buy into that formulas
full implications. The current litigation could not possibly
demonstrate the point more vividly. According to the plaintiffs
in Defense Distributed, CAD files for 3D-printable weaponry
are not just speech, but core political speech.101 The long, mind-
numbing lists of coordinates contained in those files are not
described as mere speech about computer programming, or
speech about guns, but expressive content about the right to
keep and bear arms.102 These pretentious arguments probably
play well to certain narrow audiences who are looking for
confirmation of their pre-existing libertarian views on gun
rights. But for reasons I have outlined above, it is unrealistic to
think that courts will buy into them in any meaningful way.
If courts are not going to treat CAD files as speech in
practice, then they should abandon the idea in theory. I would
say, as I have argued elsewhere,103 that the courts should
abandon the conceit that computer codes linguistic content
makes it speech per se. Under such an analysis the First
Amendment might still come into play in cases where code is
used in the course of expressive conduct. But no expressive
intent would be presumed, meaning that mainstream,
99. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (noting that computer code is a mixture of
function and expression, and explaining that First Amendment protection is
not reserved for purely expressive communication.). See also Bernstein v.
U.S. Dept of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (This court can
find no meaningful difference between computer language, particularly high-
level languages . . . , and German or French.).
100. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (contrasting analysis of the functional
and expressive elements in decryption software). Cf. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp.
at 1435 (The music inscribed in code on the roll of a player piano is no less
protected for being wholly functional . . . . Like music and mathematical
equations, computer language is just that, language, and it communicates
information either to a computer or to those who can read it.).
101. See Memo. of Points & Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 10, 29, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dept of State, 121 F.
Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-372-RP) (Defendants have
deprived Plaintiffs customers, visitors and patrons of access to Plaintiffs
speech; impeded their ability to likewise speak on the same subjects; and
infringed their right to keep and bear arms . . . . [N]o constitutional right is so
directly linked to ones immediate physical well-being as is the right to keep
and bear arms.).
102. Memo. of Points & Auths. in Reply to Defendants Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12, Def. Distributed v. U.S.
Dept of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-372-RP).
103. See generally Langvardt, supra note 81.
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utilitarian uses of computer code would not get any scrutiny
beyond rational basis. This approach would do the necessary
work of separating the mall from the library in theory, and of
allowing courts in practice to avoid First Amendment analysis
in cases where it is intuitively inappropriate.
The obvious criticism of this approach is that it would
require judges to determine case-by-case who is speaking and
who is not. But there is much less to this criticism than meets
the eye. The reality is that case-by-case plausibility
determinations are already implicit in the law of expressive
conduct. They just occur behind the scenes. I could argue that a
highway speed limit of 75 miles per hour burdens a patriotic
message I intend to communicate by driving 76 miles per hour
(as in 1776) on the Fourth of July, but I dont make that
argument because I know its a loser. No judge in the country
would take the argument seriously enough to bother walking
through an as-applied First Amendment analysis.
It is safe to trust these calls to case-by-case judicial
intuition because they are trivially easy. The same is true in
regard to 3D printing: do you really find it difficult to
determine whether a person who downloads and prints a
hammer is speaking? Formal principles are unnecessary to
decide such questions, and as far as formal principles go, code
is speech only confuses questions that would otherwise be
obvious.
***
